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State v. Thomas: The North Carolina Supreme Court
Determines That There Are Lesser Included
Offenses of Felony Murder
The North Carolina version of the felony murder rule states that homicides
committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain felonies auto-
matically constitute first-degree murders.1 North Carolina's statutory felony
murder rule classifies certain killings as first-degree murders even though they
were not premeditated or committed intentionally. 2
In State v. Thomas3 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether there are lesser included offenses of first-degree murder when first-
degree murder is prosecuted and submitted to the jury solely under the felony
murder theory. In Thomas the court held that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury in defendant's felony murder trial on the lesser included offense
of involuntary manslaughter. 4 The court based its holding on its view that in-
voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense in a felony murder case when
the indictment and the evidence in the case would support a finding that the
defendant committed involuntary manslaughter. 5 The Thomas court also indi-
cated that second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter are lesser included
offenses in felony murder cases in which these lesser offenses are supported by
the indictment and evidence.6
This Note briefly reviews the foundation of the felony murder rule and its
development in North Carolina. The Note then surveys North Carolina felony
murder cases in which the issue of lesser included offenses has arisen. The Note
also examines how other states have dealt with the issue of the existence of lesser
included offenses of felony murder. The Note then discusses how the Thomas
decision will affect the outcome of future felony murder cases in North Carolina.
The Note concludes by arguing that the majority in Thomas arrived at a deci-
sion that is both equitable and mandated by the applicable statutes and case law.
On the night of March 17, 1987, defendant Lillian Jane Thomas, Jackie
Ray Brewer, and Donald Stout went for a drive in northern Forsyth County.7
Defendant drove. The State's evidence indicated that the three occupants of
defendant's car smoked marijuana as they drove.8 The State's evidence also in-
dicated that Brewer fired a pistol ten to fifteen times out of the window of de-
l. "A murder which shall be... committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or at-
tempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree .... N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1989). See Note, State v. Fields: Felony Murder and Psychological Use of a
Deadly Weapon, 65 N.C.L. REv. 1220, 1220 (1987).
2. See State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 71, 199 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1973).
3. 325 N.C. 583, 386 S.E.2d 555 (1989).
4. Id. at 599, 386 S.E.2d at 564.
5. Id. at 591-94, 386 S.E.2d at 559-61.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 587, 386 S.E.2d at 556-57.
8. Id. at 586, 386 S.E.2d at 556.
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fendant's car during the course of the drive. These shots took place over the
course of an hour.9 Brewer aimed one of his shots at the residence of Vickie
White Calhoun in the town of Rural Hall. Defendant told Brewer before he
shot at the Calhoun residence, "[w]hy don't you aim for the lights." 10 On the
night of March 17, 1987, a bullet came through the front window of Vickie
White Calhoun's living room, entered her heart, and killed her. 1
Defendant's evidence at trial depicted a very different version of the facts.
Defendant testified that she, Brewer and Stout drove from Winston-Salem to
Kernersville on the night of March 17, 1987.12 Brewer fired three or four shots
out of the window of defendant's car as they drove toward Kernersville. After
Brewer finished shooting, defendant asked him to put the gun away. 13 On the
return trip from Kernersville back to Winston-Salem, Brewer again shot his pis-
tol out of the car window four or five times. Defendant told Brewer to put the
gun away and not use it again. 14 Defendant testified that although Brewer fired
at road signs and into woods, he never fired at houses. 15
The State arrested and tried defendant for the murder of Vickie Calhoun.16
The State prosecuted the case as first-degree murder under the felony murder
theory, on the grounds that Vickie Calhoun's murder occurred during the perpe-
tration of the felony of discharging a firearm into an occupied structure. The
trial judge instructed the jury that it could return verdicts of guilty of first-de-
gree felony murder or not guilty.17 On November 20, 1987, the jury found de-
fendant guilty of first-degree murder under the felony murder theory. The trial
court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment.' 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court vacated defendant's conviction. 19 In
an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Exum, the court held that the trial court
committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that it could find de-
fendant guilty of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. 20 The
court reasoned that a trial judge must charge a jury on a lesser included offense
if two conditions are met. First, the lesser offense must be, as a matter of law, an
included offense of the crime for which defendant is indicted.21 Second, evi-
dence must exist that would support a conviction of this lesser offense.22
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 584-85, 386 S.E.2d at 555-56. Stout was arrested and charged with the murder of
Vickie Calhoun in March of 1987. Stout provided all of the State's evidence noted above pursuant to
a written agreement in which the State dismissed the murder charge against Stout in return for his
testimony. Id. at 585, 386 S.E.2d at 556.
12. Id. at 587, 386 S.E.2d at 557.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 588, 386 S.E.2d at 557.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 584, 386 S.E.2d at 555.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 599, 386 S.E.2d at 564.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 590, 386 S.E.2d at 559.
22. Id. at 591, 386 S.E.2d at 559.
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The court found that involuntary manslaughter is, as a matter of law, a
lesser included offense of murder when the crime is charged in a bill of indict-
ment that complies with the form set forth in section 15-144.24 of the North
Carolina General Statutes. 23 This statute describes the essentials of a bill of
indictment for homicide.24 The indictment of the defendant in Thomas followed
the form called for in the statute.25 The court noted that State v. Talbert26
teaches that an indictment in the form set forth in section 15-144" 'will support
a verdict of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, or man-
slaughter.' "27 The court also noted that involuntary manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter and second-degree murder.28 The
court concluded that since the indictment in this case would support a verdict of
second-degree murder or manslaughter under Talbert, it would also support a
verdict of involuntary manslaughter. 29
The court also stated that involuntary manslaughter is, as a matter of law, a
lesser included offense of the crime of murder even if the State bases its prosecu-
tion of defendant entirely on the felony murder theory. 30 The court noted that
in State v. Williams 31 the defendant was indicted in the form prescribed by sec-
tion 15-144 and was prosecuted for murder solely on the theory of felony mur-
der. The Williams court held that the trial court in that case committed
reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the crime of second-degree mur-
der.32 The Thomas court, therefore, cited Williams as standing for the proposi-
tion that "in a felony murder prosecution under an indictment in the form
prescribed by [section] 15-144 evidence that defendant did not commit the un-
derlying felony requires an instruction upon whatever lesser included homicides
the indictment and the evidence support."'33
After the court concluded that involuntary manslaughter is, as a matter of
law, a lesser included offense of felony murder, the court then decided that suffi-
cient evidence existed in this case to support an involuntary manslaughter con-
viction. If a defendant's culpably negligent act or omission proximately caused
an unlawful killing, the defendant has committed involuntary manslaughter. 34
Because all the evidence indicated that defendant was with Brewer when he fired
the gun several times out of defendant's car's window, the jury could have in-
ferred that defendant's act of continuing to drive as Brewer fired amounted to a
disregard for the safety and rights of others that proximately caused Calhoun's
23. Id.
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-144 (1983).
25. Thomas, 325 N.C. at 591, 386 S.E.2d at 559.
26. 282 N.C. 718, 194 S.E.2d 822 (1973).
27. Thomas, 325 N.C. at 591, 386 S.E.2d at 559 (quoting State v. Talbert, 282 N.C. 718, 721,
194 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1973)).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 284 N.C. 67, 199 S.E.2d 409 (1973).
32. Thomas, 325 N.C. at 592, 386 S.E.2d at 560.
33. Id. (quoting State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 75, 199 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1973)).
34. Id. at 598, 386 S.E.2d at 563.
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death.35 Therefore, the evidence at trial could have supported a finding that
defendant was guilty of involuntary manslaughter.3 6
The court noted that although defendant would not have been entitled to a
lesser included offense instruction if the State's evidence had supported every
element of felony murder and there had been no contradictory evidence relating
to any element of felony murder,3 7 defendant would have been entitled to an
instruction on any lesser included offense supported by the evidence if there had
been conflicting evidence relating to any element of felony murder.38 The State
based its felony murder prosecution of defendant on the theory that she acted in
concert with Brewer in committing the underlying felony of discharging a fire-
arm into an occupied structure, and that Vickie Calhoun was killed during the
course of this underlying felony. 39 Although the State produced evidence at
trial that defendant and Brewer acted in concert when Brewer shot out of de-
fendant's car's window, the court found that both the State and defendant intro-
duced evidence at trial that Brewer and defendant were not acting in concert
when Brewer fired the shots.40 Therefore, there was conflicting evidence at trial
relating to an element of felony murder. Defendant, therefore, was entitled to an
instruction on any lesser included offense supported by the evidence.
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Mitchell and joined by Justice
Webb, stated that second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and involun-
tary manslaughter are not lesser included offenses of first degree murder when
first-degree murder is submitted to the jury solely under the felony murder the-
ory.4 ' The dissent noted that State v. Weaver 42 held that for one crime to be a
lesser included offense of another crime, "all of the essential elements of the
lesser crime must also be essential elements included in the greater crime." 43
The dissent reasoned that second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and
involuntary manslaughter each contain as a necessary element the defendant's
commission of an intentional act that proximately caused the death of the vic-
tim.44 When first-degree murder is based solely upon the theory of felony mur-
der, however, first-degree murder does not include any element requiring that
the defendant committed an intentional act that proximately caused the victim's
death.45 In addition, malice is an essential element of second-degree murder,
35. Id. at 598-99, 386 S.E.2d at 564.
36. Id. at 599, 386 S.E.2d at 564.
37. Id. at 594, 386 S.E.2d at 561.
38. Id. at 595, 386 S.E.2d at 562.
39. Id. at 594-95, 386 S.E.2d at 561-62.
40. Id. at 598, 386 S.E.2d at 563. One of the State's witnesses testified that defendant told her
that defendant did not know that Brewer had a gun on the night in question until lie began shooting.
This witness also testified that defendant told her that after Brewer fired the gun, defendant pulled
her car over, held a butcher knife to Brewer's throat, and told him not to pull out the gun or fire it
again. Id. at 596-97, 386 S.E.2d at 562-63.
41. Id. at 605, 386 S.E.2d at 568 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
42. 306 N.C. 629, 295 S.E.2d 375 (1982).
43. Thomas, 325 N.C. at 603, 386 S.E.2d at 566 (Mitchell, J., dissenting) (quoting State v.
Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 635, 295 S.E.2d 375, 378-79 (1982)).
44. Id. at 604, 386 S.E.2d at 567 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 604-05, 386 S.E.2d at 567 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
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but it is not an essential element of first-degree murder when first-degree murder
is based solely on the felony murder theory." Therefore, second-degree murder,
voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter each contain one or
more essential elements that are not essential elements of felony murder. The
lesser degrees of homicide, therefore, are not lesser included offenses of felony
murder.47
The dissent noted that because Weaver indicates that no lesser included
offenses of felony murder exist, Weaver overruled Williams.4 8 The dissent also
claimed that the State's submission of a felony murder charge to a jury solely
under the felony murder theory has the effect of acquitting the defendant of
premeditated first-degree murder and its lesser included offenses of second-de-
gree murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter.49 The dis-
sent therefore concluded that the trial court in this case did not err in refusing to
instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. 50
Under the common-law felony murder rule, someone causing a death dur-
ing the commission or attempted commission of a felony was guilty of murder.5'
Scholars disagree about when the rule originated, but clearly it existed by the
eighteenth century. 52 All felony murders at common law were punishable by
death. 53
Commentators have extensively criticized the felony murder rule.5 4 One
46. Id. at 603-04, 386 S.E.2d at 567 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 605, 386 S.E.2d at 568 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 602-03, 386 S.E.2d at 566 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). The Thomas majority rejected
the dissent's claims that Weaver overruled Williams and that Weaver indicated that there are no
lesser included offenses of felony murder. Id. at 593, 386 S.E.2d at 560. The majority explained that
Weaver clearly indicated that the existence of lesser included offenses in a case must be determined
by examining the crime charged in the indictment. Id. The majority's view of Weaver indicated that
when an indictment charges a defendant in a felony murder case with "murder," the court must
determine whether murder contains all the essential elements that are contained in lesser degrees of
homicide in order to determine if these lesser degrees of homicide can be lesser included offenses.
This contradicts the dissent's view that in a felony murder case the court must determine whether
first-degree murder contains all the essential elements that are contained in the lesser degrees of
homicide when first-degree murder is based upon the felony murder rule. The Thomas majority
stated that Weaver indicated that a court must examine the crime charged in an indictment when
determining if lesser included offenses exist, and second-degree murder can be a lesser included
offense of murder when murder is charged in an indictment that is in the form that was used in
Williams. Id. at 591, 386 S.E.2d at 559. Therefore, under the Thomas majority's view Weaver did
not overrule the Williams court's holding that the defendant in Williams was entitled to a second-
degree murder instruction.
49. Id. at 601, 386 S.E.2d at 565 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). The Thomnas majority rejected this
assertion by noting that defendants are convicted or acquitted of crimes, not theories, and that de-
fendant had not been acquitted of any crime. Id. at 593, 386 S.E.2d at 560-61.
50. Id. at 606, 386 S.E.2d at 568 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
51. Comment, The Dillon Dilemma: Finding Proportionate Felony-Murder Punishments, 72
CALIF. L. Rav. 1299, 1304 (1984).
52. Roth and Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine At Constitutional Crossroads, 70
CORNELL L. RV. 446,449 (1985). In People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980), the
Michigan Supreme Court provided a thorough history of the development of the common-law rule
of felony murder both in England and in the United States. Id. at 689-713, 299 N.W.2d at 307-19.
53. Note, supra note 1, at 1223.
54. See, eg., Aaron, 409 Mich. at 727-28, 299 N.W.2d at 326 (abolishing the felony murder rule
in Michigan) Comment, supra note 51, at 1327 (advocating the abolition of first-degree felony mur-
der); Note, Felony Murder As A First Degree Offense: An Anachronism Retained, 66 YALE L.J. 427,
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court has claimed that the rule has a questionable origin, and that the doctrine is
based on a misinterpretation of precedent. 55 In addition, some commentators
have asserted that the modem felony murder rule is unconstitutional. 56 The
most widespread criticism of the rule, however, is that it violates the basic mod-
em priiciple that criminal liability must be based upon culpability.5 7 As a gen-
eral rule "'criminal liability for causing a particular result is not justified in the
absence of some culpable mental state in respect to that result.' "58 A defendant,
however, can be convicted of murder under the felony murder rule even though
no connection exists between her state of mind and the commission of a homi-
cide.59 Therefore, a defendant can be convicted of murder under the felony
murder rule even though she did not have the culpable mental state that should
be required for her to be convicted of murder. In addition, one commentator
has noted that punishing offenses characterized by an intent to commit a felony
in the same way as offenses requiring a specific intent to kill are punished "un-
dermines the principle of culpability based on mental state."' 6°
Some courts and commentators find modem justifications for the felony
murder rule, however. One commentator suggests that courts have provided
433 (1957) (same). Commentators have noted that the felony murder rule has been described as
"'astonishing' and 'monstrous,' an unsupportable 'legal fiction,' 'an unsightly wart on the skin of the
common law,' and as an 'anachronistic remnant' that has 'no logical or practical basis for existence
in modem law."' Roth and Sundby, supra note 52, at 446 (citations omitted).
55. Aaron, 409 Mich. at 689-98, 299 N.W.2d at 307-12. The Aaron court noted that although
some commentators believe that the felony murder rule originated in Lord Dacres' case, 72 Eng.
Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535), the defendant in that case was not convicted of murder merely because some-
one was killed during the course of the defendant's commission of an unlawful act. Instead, the
Aaron court stated that the defendant in Lord Dacres' case had the necessary mens rea of murder,
even though he did not kill the victim, because the defendant, the killer, and their companions had
previously agreed to kill anyone who might resist them when they carried out the unlawful act of
entering a park to hunt without permission. Aaron, 409 Mich. at 690, 299 N.W.2d at 307-08. The
Aaron court noted that although Mansell & Herbert's case, 73 Eng. Rep. 279 (K.B. 1558), has also
been cited as the origin of the felony murder rule, this case involved a deliberate act of violence.
Aaron, 409 Mich. at 691-92, 299 N.W.2d at 308-09. The Aaron court also noted that Lord Coke's
definition of felony murder has been cited as the origin of the rule. Id. at 692-93, 299 N.W.2d at 308-
09. The Aaron court stated that Coke had no authority for his statement of the rule, however, and it
noted that some commentators indicate that Coke created the rule as a result of his mistranslation
and misinterpretation of a passage from the writings of Bracton. Id. at 693-94, 299 N.W.2d at 309-
10.
56. Roth and Sundby, supra note 52, at 448. Roth and Sundby state that the felony murder
rule must be viewed as being based upon one of two alternative theoretical underpinnings. Id. First,
the rule may be viewed as allowing the required mens rea for murder to be conclusively presumed
from the defendant's mens rea in committing a felony. Id. at 460. Second, the rule may be viewed
instead as constituting a distinct form of homicide based upon the intent to commit the underlying
felony. Id. at 448. If the felony murder rule operates as a conclusive presumption, Roth and Sundby
contend that it violates due process. If the rule constitutes a distinct form of homicide, it violates
due process and the eighth amendment. Id.
57. See, e-g., People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 733, 299 N.W.2d 304, 328 (1980) (felony murder
rule is wrong because "it violates the basic premise of individual moral culpability upon which our
criminal law is based.")
58. Id. at 708, 299 N.W.2d at 316 (quoting Gegan, Criminal Homicide in the Revised New York
Penal Law, 12 N.Y. L. FORUM 565, 586 (1966)).
59. The intent to commit a felony is the only mental state that a defendant must have had in
order to be convicted of felony murder. Aaron, 409 Mich at 708, 299 N.W.2d at 317. Therefore, a
defendant can be convicted of felony murder even though she did not have any mental state, such as
an intent to kill, intent to harm, or recklessness, that is related to the commission of the homicide.
60. Note, supra note 54, at 433.
four main justifications for the rule's existence today.61 First, the felony murder
rule deters negligent and accidental killings during the commission of felonies
and also deters dangerous felonies themselves.62 Second, someone who commits
a homicide during the course of committing or attempting to commit a felony
automatically has the necessary culpability to be found guilty of murder. This
justification may be based on the theory that "the intent to commit the felony is
'transferred' to the act of killing in order to find culpability for the homicide"; 63
alternatively, it may be based on the theory that homicidal mens rea is conclu-
sively presumed from the commission of the felony.64 Third, the felony murder
rule simply serves to exact retribution for a killing that occurs during the com-
mission or attempted commission of a felony. 65 Finally, the general culpability
theory serves as a modem-day justification for the felony murder rule. This
theory teaches that someone who does a bad act should be punished for both the
expected and the unexpected consequences of this act.66
The felony murder rule currently exists in some form in forty-six states.67
Most states have limited the scope of the felony murder rule, however.68 Some
apply the felony murder rule only to felonies set forth in a statute.69 One state's
felony murder rule only applies to felonies punishable with death or life impris-
onment. 70 Another state's felony murder rule only applies when the victim's
death is caused by the defendant's commission or attempted commission of an
act clearly dangerous to human life.71 The possible harsh effects of the felony
murder rule motivated these limitations on the rule.72
The General Assembly of North Carolina codifed the common-law felony
murder rule into North Carolina statutory law in 1893. 7 3 The general assembly
classified felony murder as first-degree murder.74 The North Carolina Supreme
Court narrowed the scope of the felony murder rule in 1972 in the case of State
v. Thompson,75 in which it held that the felony murder rule only applied to
61. Roth and Sundby, supra note 52, at 450.
62. Id. at 450-51.
63. Id. at 453. This theory is known as the transferred intent theory. Id.
64. Id. at 456. This theory is known as constructive malice. Id.
65. Id. at 457.
66. Id. at 458-59.
67. Note, supra note 1, at 1224.
68. Id. For an exhaustive survey of states' modern restrictions on the felony murder rule, see
People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 699-713, 299 N.W.2d 304, 312-19 (1980).
69. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (1986) (rule only applies to arson, robbery, bur-
glary, kidnapping, first or second degree sexual assault, sexual assault on a child, and escape); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1(2) (Bums 1978) (felony murder rule only applies to arson, burglary, child
molesting, consumer product tampering, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape, and robbery);
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1984) (rule only applies to arson, sexual assault, robbery, and burglary).
70. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (Law. Co-op 1980).
71. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(3) (Vernon 1989).
72. Note, supra note 1, at 1224. Under the common law rule, for example, killings committed
during the commission or attempted commission of felonies that are not inherently dangerous and
that present no reasonable, foreseeable risk of death are punished to the same severe extent as inten-
tional killings. Id.
73. State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301, 305, 56 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1949).
74. Id.
75. 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972).
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homicides committed during the commission of either the statutorily enumer-
ated felonies of arson, rape, robbery and burglary, or felonies that create a
"'substantial foreseeable human risk and actually result in the loss of life.' "76
The general assembly further narrowed the scope of the felony murder rule in
North Carolina in 1977 when it amended section 14-17 so that the felony mur-
der rule only applied to the statutorily enumerated felonies (which by that time
included kidnapping) and felonies attempted or committed with the use of a
deadly weapon.77
North Carolina cases indicate that a defendant charged with felony murder
had never been entitled to a lesser included offense instruction if all of the evi-
dence implicating defendant in a homicide tended to show that the homicide was
committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony covered by
the felony murder rule.78 In State v. Crawford,79 for example, in which all the
evidence indicated that defendant killed the victim while raping her, the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly instructed the jury
that it must either find defendant guilty of first-degree murder or acquit him.80
The court came to a similar conclusion in State v. Woods,81 in which it found
that since "no evidence in the.., record... suggests deceased was killed other
than in the perpetration of the felonies of kidnapping and rape, . . . the trial
judge did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the question of defendant's
guilt of the lesser included offense of second degree murder."'82
In State v. Williams8 3 the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated that
lesser included offenses of felony murder can exist in a case if the evidence at
trial supports these lesser offenses. The defendant in Williams was convicted of
first-degree murder84 solely under the felony murder theory, on the grounds that
he killed the victim while committing the felony of discharging a firearm into an
occupied building.8 5 The court noted, however, that the jury would be permit-
ted to infer from the testimony at trial of a witness to the killing that defendant
shot the victim when they both were inside the same building.86 If defendant
76. Note, supra note 1, at 1225-26 (quoting Thompson, 280 N.C. at 211, 185 S.E.2d at 672).
77. Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 406, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 407, 407 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1986)). The felonies enumerated in this statute are arson, rape, robbery,
kidnapping, and burglary. Id.
78. See, eg., State v. Woods, 286 N.C. 612, 631-32, 213 S.E.2d 214, 227 (1975) (defendant not
entitled to lesser included offense instruction when all evidence of victim's death tended to show that
the victim was killed while defendant was committing kidnapping and robbery), vacated in part, 428
U.S. 903 (1976); State v. Crawford, 260 N.C. 548, 559, 133 S.E.2d 232, 240 (1963) (defendant in
felony murder case not entitled to lesser included offense instruction when all evidence at trial
tended to show that defendant killed victim while raping her).
79. 260 N.C. 548, 133 S.E.2d 232 (1963).
80. Id. at 560, 133 S.E.2d at 240.
81. 286 N.C. at 612, 213 S.E.2d at 214.
82. Id. at 632, 213 S.E.2d at 227. Woods explicitly states that "[w]hen all the evidence tends to
show that the accused killed the deceased in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony
and there is no evidence of guilt of a lesser offense, the court correctly refrains from submitting the
question of defendant's guilt of murder in the second degree." Id. at 631, 213 SE.2d at 227.
83. 284 N.C. 67, 199 S.E.2d 409 (1973).
84. Id. at 70, 199 S.E.2d at 411.
85. Id. at 71, 199 S.E.2d at 411.
86. Id. at 74, 199 S.E.2d at 413.
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and the victim were both in the same building at the time of the killing, then
defendant did not commit the underlying felony of discharging a firearm into an
occupied building, because one can only discharge a firearm into a building when
one is outside of that building. If defendant and the victim were both in the
same building at the time of the killing, therefore, defendant was not guilty of
felony murder.87 If defendant killed the victim while both were in the same
building then defendant could not be found guilty of any homicide greater than
second-degree murder unless the State proved that the killing was premeditated
and intentional.8 8 The court in Williams vacated defendant's conviction because
the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it could have found defendant
guilty of a lesser degree of homicide instead of finding him guilty of felony mur-
der. 89 Although the court only specifically mentioned second-degree murder as
being a lesser included offense of felony murder, the court's reasoning clearly
indicated that any degree of homicide can be a lesser included offense of felony
murder if there is sufficient evidence at trial to support a finding that the defend-
ant is guilty of this lesser degree of homicide.
Dicta in cases decided after Williams also indicate that felony murder can
contain lesser included offenses. In both State v. Warren90 and State v. Wall, 9 1
for example, the court noted that a trial court in a felony murder case is not
"'required to submit to the jury second-degree murder or manslaughter unless
there is evidence to support it.' "92 This statement implies that the courts mak-
ing this statement believed that a trial court would be required to instruct a jury
in a felony murder case on second-degree murder or on either one of the degrees
of manslaughter if there were sufficient evidence to support a finding that one of
these crimes had been committed.
In State v. Weaver 93 the court set forth the basic tests for determining if any
crime is, as a matter of law, a lesser included offense of any other crime. The
court stated that a greater crime must contain all the essential elements of a
lesser crime in order for the lesser crime to be a lesser included offense of the
greater crime. "If the lesser crime has an essential element which is not com-
pletely covered by the greater crime, it is not a lesser included offense." 94 The
court also stated that "the definitions accorded the crimes determine whether
one offense is a lesser included offense of another crime."' 95 The court reasoned
that deciding whether one crime is a lesser included offense of another requires
an examination of the crimes' definitions, rather than an examination of whether
the facts of a particular case could support a finding that defendant committed
87. Id. at 75, 199 S.E.2d at 414.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 292 N.C. 235, 232 S.E.2d 419 (1977).
91. 304 N.C. 609, 286 S.E.2d 68 (1982).
92. Wall, 304 N.C. at 620, 286 S.E.2d at 75 (quoting Warren, 292 N.C. at 242, 232 S.E.2d at
423); Warren, 292 N.C. at 242, 232 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 407, 226
S.E.2d 652, 669 (1976)).
93. 306 N.C. 629, 295 S.E.2d 375 (1982).
94. Id. at 635, 295 S.E.2d at 379.
95. Id., 295 S.E.2d at 378.
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either one of the two crimes. The Weaver court applied these standards to an
analysis of the offenses that the defendant in that case claimed should have been
submitted to the jury. The court therefore concluded that the offenses of taking
indecent liberties with a child under the age of sixteen, assaulting a child under
the age of twelve, and assault on a female by a male over the age of eighteen
were not lesser included offenses of the crime of first-degree rape of a child of the
age of twelve or less. 96
Research reveals that only four jurisdictions other than North Carolina ap-
pear to have specifically addressed the question of whether a trial court must
issue lesser included offense instructions in felony murder cases in which there is
evidence that would support a finding that the defendant was guilty of a lesser
degree of homicide.97 Florida is among these four states. In Linehan v. State98
the Florida Supreme Court held that "second degree murder is a necessarily
included offense of first-degree premeditated and felony murder." 99 In Scurry v.
State,100 the Florida court noted in dictum that manslaughter is a necessarily
included offense of first-degree felony murder. 10 ' Although the courts' use of
the phrase "necessarily included offenses" seems to indicate that second-degree
murder and manslaughter are lesser included offenses of first-degree felony mur-
der whether or not there is evidence to support these lesser offenses, Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.490 states that a trial court can not issue instruc-
tions on any degree of a crime if that crime is not supported by the evidence.10 2
The Linehan and Scurry decisions, when read in light of Florida's rules of crimi-
nal procedure, indicate that a trial judge in Florida must instruct a jury on sec-
ond-degree murder and manslaughter if there is evidence to support these lesser
offenses.10 3 Neither the Linehan court nor the Scurry court stated the reasoning
behind their decisions. The Linehan court cited no authority in support of its
decision, and the Scurry court merely cited the Linehan court. 104 Each court
merely made a terse, unelaborated statement of its decision.
The felony murder rule has been abolished in Michigan.' 0 5 A few years
96. Id. at 633, 295 S.E.2d at 377.
97. There are also some other jurisdictions that share North Carolina's rule that no lesser in-
cluded offense instructions may be given in felony murder cases in which all of the evidence implicat-
ing defendant in a killing indicates that the killing was committed in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a felony. See State v. Bradley, 361 Mo. 267, 234 S.W.2d. 556 (1950); People v.
Schleiman, 197 N.Y. 383, 90 N.E. 950 (1910).
98. 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985).
99. Id. at 1265.
100. 521 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1989).
101. Id. at 1078.
102. "If the indictment or information charges an offense divided into degrees, the jury may find
the defendant guilty of the offense charged or any lesser degree supported by the evidence. The
judge shall not instruct on any degree as to which there is no evidence." FLA. STAT. ANN. Rule
3.490 (West 1989).
103. The Scurry court merely stated that "[t]his court, in Linehan, made a policy determination
that the same category one necessarily lesser included degrees of homicide of second-degree murder
and manslaughter that were applicable for first-degree premeditated murder should also be applica-
ble for first-degree felony murder." Scurry, 521 So. 2d at 1078.
104. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 727, 299 N.W.2d 304, 326 (1980).
105. 395 Mich. 434, 236 N.W.2d 500 (1975).
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before the Michigan Supreme Court abolished the rule, however, it held in Peo-
ple v. Carter 106 that there are lesser included offenses of first-degree felony mur-
der.10 7 The Carter court stated that second-degree murder is always a lesser
included offense of first-degree murder, because second-degree murder is merely
first-degree murder minus the existence of premeditation or a felony covered by
the felony murder rule.'0 8 The Carter court also cited with approval a previous
case that indicated that manslaughter is a lesser included offense of felony mur-
der when manslaughter is supported by the evidence. 10 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded in
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Carmona 110 that under the law of the Virgin
Islands second-degree murder can be a lesser included offense of felony mur-
der.'1 1 The court stated that a lesser offense is a lesser included offense of an
offense charged if the lesser offense is "comprised solely of some but not all of
the elements of the offen[s]e charged" and if there is a conflict of evidence as to
an element of the offense charged that is not an element of the lesser offense.
11 2
The court reasoned that second-degree murder contains some but not all of the
elements of first-degree murder, and that in Carmona that conflicting evidence
existed as to an element of felony murder that was not an element of second-
degree murder. The court therefore concluded in that felony murder case the
defendant was entitled to a second-degree murder instruction.
113
In Fuller v. United States 114 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit stated that a defendant charged with felony murder
in the District of Columbia may receive a second-degree murder instruction if
sufficient evidence exists for the jury to find the defendant innocent of felony
murder but guilty of second-degree murder." 5 The court in Fuller did not state
any detailed justification for this view; the court merely relied on precedent. 16
The holdings of what seem to be the only four jurisdictions other than
North Carolina that have addressed the issue of whether then can be lesser in-
cluded offenses of felony murder shed some light on Thomas. All four jurisdic-
tions held that there can be lesser included offenses of felony murder, and this
indicates that Thomas is in accord with the prevailing view. None of these juris-
dictions' analyses was substantially similar to the Thomas court's analysis, how-
ever, so the Thomas court's reasoning does not appear necessarily to reflect the
views of courts in any other jurisdiction.
The majority and the dissent in Thomas reached different conclusions be-
106. Id. at 437, 236 N.W.2d at 502.
107. Id. at 438, 236 N.W.2d at 503.
108. Id.
109. 422 F.2d 95 (1970).
110. Id. at 100.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 407 F.2d 1199 (1967), aff'd on rehearing, 407 F.2d 1221 (1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1120(1969).
114. Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1221, 1229 (1968).
115. Id.
116. Thomas, 325 N.C. at 593, 386 S.E.2d at 560.
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cause they fundamentally disagreed on what constitutes the greater crime in fel-
ony murder cases. The majority believed that the crime charged in the bill of
indictment is the greater crime for purposes of determining whether there are
lesser included offenses.1 17 The majority stated that murder is the greater crime
when the indictment of a defendant is in the form prescribed by section 15-144.
An indictment for murder will support a verdict of first-degree murder, second-
degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter is a
lesser included offense of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, so
the majority concluded that involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included of-
fense of murder.' 1 8 The majority stated that a defendant who is indicted for
murder is entitled to receive lesser included offenses instructions for all lesser
included offenses of murder that are supported by the evidence, even if the State
prosecutes the defendant solely on the felony murder theory.' 19
The dissent seemed to state that first-degree murder is the greater offense
when a murder charge is submitted to the jury solely under the felony murder
theory, 120 but the dissent actually treated "first-degree murder based upon the
felony murder rule" as the greater offense in such a case. The dissent seemed to
refer to first-degree murder as the greater offense in this case. 121 To apply the
Weaver lesser-included-offense standards, however, it analyzed the essential ele-
ments that first-degree murder contains when it is based upon the felony murder
theory. 122 The dissent believed that the essential elements first-degree murder
contains when it is submitted solely under the theory of felony murder are differ-
ent than the essential elements it contains when submitted under the theory of
premeditation. 123 The dissent therefore believed that when first-degree murder
is prosecuted under the theory of premeditation, it contains lesser included of-
fenses that first-degree murder does not contain when it is prosecuted under the
felony murder theory.1 24 The dissent therefore treated first-degree murder
based upon felony murder as a different greater offense than first-degree murder
based on premeditation. The dissent reasoned that the only essential elements of
the crime of "first-degree murder based upon the felony murder rule" are that
the defendant knowingly committed or attempted to commit a felony covered by
the felony murder rule and that there was a killing related to this felony. 125 The
dissent also reasoned that the defendant's commission of an intentional act prox-
imately causing the victim's death is an essential element of all lesser degrees of
homicide. The dissent concluded that since these lesser degrees of homicide
117. Id. at 591, 386 S.E.2d at 559.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 604, 386 S.E.2d at 567 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). The dissent implied that it consid-
ered first-degree murder to be the greater crime when it stated that "Malice is not an element of the
greater offense of first-degree murder, however, when the greater offense of first degree-murder is
based solely upon the felony murder theory." Id. (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 603, 386 S.E.2d at 566-67 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 604, 386 S.E.2d at 567 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 605, 386 S.E.2d at 568 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
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contain an essential element that is not an essential element of first degree mur-
der based upon the felony murder rule, these lesser degrees of homicide are not
lesser included offenses of felony murder.12 6
The majority and the dissent did not examine closely policy considerations
in their opinions. For example, neither opinion discussed whether the holding in
Thomas will result in fewer defendants being convicted of felony murder. The
opinions also did not discuss whether increasing or decreasing the number of
felony murder convictions is desirable. The majority and dissent also did not
examine in depth whether it is fair to prevent a defendant in a felony murder
case from receiving the benefit of a jury instruction on lesser included offenses.
Although neither opinion examined in detail the holding's fairness, the ma-
jority did discuss this issue in dictum. The majority noted that in criminal cases
in which no lesser included offense instruction is allowed, and in which defend-
ant is clearly guilty of some crime even though one of the elements of the offense
charged may remain in doubt, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts by convict-
ing the defendant of the crime charged. 127 The court noted that Thomas is such
a case, and the court expressed its concern that the jury in this case not be forced
to choose between finding the defendant not guilty or finding him guilty as
charged. 128
Although the Thomas court only specifically held that involuntary man-
slaughter is a lesser included offense of felony murder as a matter of law, the
court's reasoning clearly indicates that second-degree murder and voluntary
manslaughter are also lesser included offenses of felony murder as a matter of
law. The court stated that Williams "is clear authority for the proposition that
in a felony murder prosecution under an indictment in the form prescribed by
N.C.G.S. § 15-144 evidence that defendant did not commit the underlying fel-
ony requires an instruction upon whatever lesser included homicides the indict-
ment and the evidence support." 129 It is clear, therefore, that after Thomas, a
trial court must instruct the jury in a felony murder case on any lesser degrees of
homicide that are supported by the indictment and the evidence.
Thomas' impact on jury instructions cannot be ascertained with certainty,
because it cannot be determined definitely what types of instructions trial judges
issued before Thomas. One can logically deduce what types of instructions prob-
ably were issued by trial courts in felony murder cases before Thomas, however.
It therefore is possible to predict Thomas' probable impact on jury instructions
in felony murder cases.
Many pre-Thomas trial courts probably issued the types of lesser included
offenses instructions in felony murder cases that now are specifically required by
Thomas, so Thomas probably will have only a limited effect on, the type of jury
instructions that are issued in felony murder cases. The court held in Williams
in 1973 that the trial court in that case had committed reversible error by failing
126. Id. at 599, 386 S.E.2d at 564.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 592, 386 S.E.2d 560.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.
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to instruct the jury in a felony murder case on second-degree murder when the
indictment and the evidence supported a finding of second-degree murder.130 It
is likely that many trial courts interpreted Williams as teaching that any lesser
degree of homicide can be a lesser included offense in a felony murder case if the
lesser offense is supported by the indictment and evidence, even though the Wil-
liams court did not specifically make such a holding. Therefore, these pre-
Thomas trial judges issued lesser included offenses instructions in felony murder
cases.
Thomas nevertheless probably will cause some trial courts to change the
way they instruct juries in felony murder cases. It is likely that some pre-
Thomas trial courts did not instruct juries in felony murder cases on lesser de-
grees of homicide. These pre-Thomas trial judges shared the Thomas dissent's
view that Weaver overruled Williams, and that "first degree murder based upon
the felony murder theory" is the greater crime in felony murder cases. These
judges therefore believed that no lesser included offenses of felony murder exist.
After Thomas, however, these trial judges will have to instruct the jury in a
felony murder case on a lesser degree of homicide if the indictment and evidence
support the finding that the defendant committed one of these lesser offenses.
Thomas will cause more courts to instruct juries on lesser included offenses
in felony murder cases, so Thomas probably will result in fewer defendants being
convicted of felony murder. The Thomas court noted that when lesser included
offense instructions are not allowed in a criminal case, and defendant clearly is
guilty of some offense even though there is some doubt about the existence of
one of the elements of the offense charged, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts
by convicting the defendant of the crime charged.13 ' This statement probably is
true to some extent. When a defendant clearly has broken the law in some seri-
ous way, but the jury has not been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant has committed every element of the only crime of which the jury can
convict him, it seems reasonable to assume that the jury will sometimes convict
the defendant of the offense charged rather than let him go free. If the jury in
such a case had the option of convicting the defendant of a lesser crime than the
crime charged, it seems likely that the jury would often convict the defendant of
this lesser crime rather then convict him of the crime charged. Since it is likely
that some pre-Thomas trial courts failed to instruct the jury in felony murder
cases on lesser degrees of homicide, some of these juries probably convicted de-
fendants of felony murder even though they would have convicted these defend-
ants of lesser crimes instead if the trial courts had instructed them that they
could do so. Since all trial courts after Thomas will have to instruct juries in
felony murder cases on lesser degrees of homicide if the indictments and the
evidence support these offenses, Thomas probably will result in fewer defendants
being convicted of felony murder.
Because it is likely that Thomas will decrease the number of defendants
who are convicted of felony murder, this case follows with a national trend lim-
130. Thomas, 325 N.C. at 599, 386 S.E.2d at 564; see supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
1140 [Vol. 68
CRIMINAL LAW
iting the number of defendants convicted of felony murder. Some states have
restricted the scope of the felony murder rule by such means as limiting the
types of felonies covered by the felony murder rule or applying the felony mur-
der rule only when the victim's death is caused by the defendant's commission
or attempted commission of an act clearly dangerous to human life.132 These
limitations in the scope of the felony murder rule necessarily result in a decrease
in the number of defendants convicted of felony murder. Although Thomas
does not change the scope of the substantive felony murder rule in North Caro-
lina, it probably will result in fewer defendants being found guilty of felony
murder.
The holding in Thomas will have beneficial results. For example, Thomas
will help ensure that defendants in felony murder cases will not be convicted
unjustly. Thomas may result in fewer defendants being convicted of felony mur-
der in cases in which juries have some doubts that the defendants committed
every essential element of felony murder. 133 Thomas, therefore, will help ensure
that a defendant will not be convicted of felony murder when a jury does not
believe that the defendant is guilty of felony murder.
The Thomas rule also may help the State. If lesser included offenses in-
structions are not allowed and a jury thinks that a defendant is guilty of some
crime, but the jury is not convinced that the State has proven every essential
element of felony murder, the jury may choose to acquit the defendant. The
State therefore runs the risk of having some defendants set free, even though
these defendants are guilty of some type of criminal homicide. After Thomas, a
jury in a felony murder case will be free to find a defendant guilty of a lesser
degree of homicide rather than set the defendant free merely because the State
has failed to prove every element of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State may be concerned that the allowance of lesser included offenses
instructions will allow a jury to mitigate the harshness of the felony murder rule
improperly by finding a defendant guilty of a lesser degree of homicide even
though the State has proven every element of felony murder. Under the facts of
Thomas, for example, in which the state's evidence showed that an intoxicated
defendant drove a car while someone else shot a gun out of the car's window, the
State may be concerned that the jury would hesitate to find the defendant guilty
of a crime for which the defendant faces either death or life imprisonment. Even
if the State proved every essential element of felony murder in this case, the jury
may find the defendant guilty of a lesser degree of homicide simply because the
jury believes that the mandatory punishment for first-degree murder is too se-
vere a punishment for defendant's actions.
Although there is a danger that juries will arrive at such compromise ver-
dicts if lesser included offenses instructions are allowed, this danger does not
outweigh the benefits of the Thomas holding. Thomas may prevent some de-
fendants from being unjustly convicted of a capital crime, and it also may result
in fewer defendants who are guilty of some type of criminal homicide being set
132. See supra text accompanying note 131.
133. Thomas, 325 N.C. at 590, 386 S.E.2d at 559.
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free. These significant beneficial results, which may result in fewer defendants
being unjustly sent to jail for life or executed and fewer killers being set free,
outweigh the danger that some juries may improperly convict defendants of
lesser degrees of homicide when the defendants are actually guilty of felony
murder.
Thomas also will improve the integrity of jury verdicts in felony murder
cases. If a pre-Thomas jury believed that a defendant was guilty of a lesser de-
gree of homicide, but this jury did not have the opportunity of convicting the
defendant of a lesser degree of homicide, this jury may have convicted the de-
fendant of felony murder even though it did not believe that the defendant was
guilty of felony murder. A pre-Thomas jury in such a situation may have de-
cided instead to simply acquit the defendant. After Thomas, however, a jury in
this situation can convict a defendant of any lesser degree of homicide that is
supported by the indictment and the evidence. Although some pre-Thomas ju-
ries may have rendered verdicts that were not based on the facts found, there-
fore, juries after Thomas will have a better opportunity to render verdicts that
are based upon their determinations of the facts.
Thomas will be easy for trial courts to apply. In deciding whether to issue a
lesser included offenses instruction, a trial judge must make two determinations.
First, he must determine if there are included offenses of the crime for which
defendant is indicted. 134 Because the standard form of indictment for those in-
dicted for murder will support a finding of any lesser degree of homicide,' 35 it
generally will be easy for a trial judge in a felony murder case to determine if the
indictment in the case will allow lesser included offenses instructions to be
given.13 6 Second, the trial judge must make an assessment of the evidence at
trial to determine if the evidence will support a finding of a lesser degree of
134. Id. at 591, 386 S.E.2d at 559.
135. It is not clear if there is any form of indictment for felony murder that would not support
lesser included offenses. Section 15-144 states that an indictment containing certain general allega-
tions set forth in the statute is "good and sufficient" as an indictment for murder and manslaughter,
Thomas states that an indictment that follows the form set forth in the statute will support lesser
included offenses. See supra notes 23-29. Section 15-144 does not state that an indictment for mur-
der cannot contain additional information, however. It therefore seems possible that an indictment
could specifically allege first-degree murder in addition to containing the words set forth in § 15-144.
This proposition is supported by State v. Puckett, 211 N.C. 66, 189 S.E. 183 (1937), in which the
court upheld the validity of an indictment that contained, in addition to the words required by § 15-
144, specific allegations that defendant had committed a premeditated killing or had committed
murder while committing or attempting to commit a robbery. Id. at 73, 189 S.E. at 187. The
Thomas court did not state whether an indictment specifically alleging first-degree murder would
support lesser included offenses. It is possible that the court would decide that an indictment which
contains the words set forth in § 15-144 would support lesser included offenses regardless of any
more specific allegations contained in the indictment. In the alternative, if an indictment specifically
alleged first-degree murder the court could apply the Weaver standards to determine what the lesser
included offenses of first-degree murder are. Research does not reveal any cases in which the court
has specifically defined the lesser included offenses of first-degree murder.
It would be irrelevant if an indictment also specifically alleged that a defendant was being
charged with felony murder. The Thomas court stated that a defendant who is prosecuted under the
felony murder theory is charged with the crime of first-degree murder; the court stated that felony
murder is merely a theory under which this crime may be proved. Thomas, 325 N.C. at 593, 386
S.E.2d at 560-61. When determining whether lesser included offenses instructions are required,
therefore, felony murder could not be treated as the crime for which a defendant was indicted.
136. Thomas, 328 N.C. at 591, 386 S.E.2d at 559.
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homicide.13 7 Trial judges frequently have to make such evidentiary decisions, so
this second determination should not be too difficult for a judge to perform and
it should not cause much delay.
The holding in Thomas is well-reasoned and achieves the correct result.
Weaver states that a defendant may be convicted of either the crime charged in
an indictment or of "a less degree of the crime charged." 13 8 This use of the
phrase "crime charged" indicates that the majority correctly decided that the
crime charged in a bill of indictment is the greater crime for purposes of apply-
ing the Weaver lesser-included-offenses test. The majority, therefore, rightly de-
cided that the existence of lesser included offenses of murder does not depend
upon whether or not the case is submitted to the jury under the felony murder
theory. The majority also was correct in reasoning that since the indictment of
defendant would support a verdict of second-degree murder or voluntary man-
slaughter, and since involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of
these two crimes, the indictment would support a verdict of involuntary
manslaughter.
The dissent's reasoning is not persuasive. The dissent's central assumption
that there is a greater offense of "first degree murder based upon the felony
murder rule" is wrong, because neither the state's statutes nor case law indicates
that first-degree murder based on the felony murder theory is a different offense
from first-degree murder based upon the theory of premeditation. The dissent's
central assumption is wrong, so the conclusion which is based upon this assump-
tion-that there are no lesser included offenses of felony murder-is also wrong.
In State v. Thomas the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial
court in a felony murder case must instruct the jury on involuntary manslaugh-
ter if the indictment and the evidence in the case would support a finding that
the defendant committed involuntary manslaughter. The court's reasoning
clearly indicates that any lesser degree of homicide is a lesser included offense of
felony murder if the evidence and indictment in a case support a finding that a
defendant committed a lesser degree of homicide. This well-reasoned rule prob-
ably will result in fewer defendants being convicted of felony murder in North
Carolina.
DAVID GEORGE HESTER
137. State v. Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 638-39, 295 S.E.2d 375, 380 (1982).
138. Thomas, 325 N.C. at 591, 386 S.E.2d at 559.
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